A rusty broadsword hangs in the Military Museum of the Chinese
People's Revolution, dozens gather to stare.??
The broadsword looks dark and its blade blunt. Yet, according to
the museum guide, Chinese soldiers used the weapon against Japanese
troops in the first days of the War of Resistance Against Japanese
Aggression (1937-1945) in north China.
In the memoirs of General Qin Dechun (1893-1963), then vice
commander of the 29th Army fighting around Lugouqiao Bridge (Marco
Polo Bridge) in southern suburban Beijing, he described Chinese
broadsword troops assaulting a Japanese position: "Who said the
Japanese 'royal' soldiers were not afraid of death? They kowtowed
before Chinese broadsword holders to beg for mercy."
Lugouqiao Incident
Standing above the Yongding River, Lugouqiao Bridge has long
been a major icon of the capital. The landscape around it is famous
for its serene and peaceful atmosphere.
But on the night of July 7, 1937, this sense of tranquility was
shattered. With the Lugouqiao Incident, Japan started its all-out
invasion of China, while the Chinese had to make the choice between
subjugating themselves to Japanese rule or uniting to fight for the
country's dignity and independence.
For Chinese living in northeast China, September 18, 1931, was a
day of humiliation. On that day, the Japanese occupied and began
supporting an illegal Manchurian kingdom in northeast China.
In the following years, Japanese troops in north China there as
a result of unfair foreign treaties Qing Dynasty and warlord
governments signed with Japan in the early 20th century tried to
provoke the Chinese government.
Under strong military and diplomatic pressure, the then
Kuomintang (KMT) government under Chiang Kai-shek (1887-1975) made
concessions time and time again. "As soldiers who had the
responsibility of defending our land and sovereignty, we had to
make concessions repeatedly. The sorrow and regret were
imaginable," Qin said in his memoirs.
However, Japanese generals were not satisfied with China's
concessions. In 1936, Japanese troops conducted provocative war
exercises in Fengtai in the southern suburbs of Peiping, the name
of Beijing at the time, and ignited a bloody conflict with Chinese
troops.
Soon after, the Japanese occupied Fengtai.
Beginning in late June 1937, several hundred Japanese soldiers
were deployed to the west end of Marco Polo Bridge while Kuomintang
forces, garrisoned in Wanping Town near the bridge, watched
closely.
At midnight on July 7, the Japanese army telegraphed the KMT
forces saying that a soldier was missing and was believed to be
hiding inside the town. The Japanese demanded that its army should
be allowed to enter the town to search for the missing soldier.
Colonel Ji Xingwen (1908-1958) denied the request.
In the early morning of July 8, Japanese artillery started
shelling the town and invading infantry, supported by tanks,
marched across the bridge at dawn. Ji ordered the KMT forces, made
up of about 1,000 soldiers, to hold the Japanese back at all costs.
By the afternoon, Japanese forces had partially overrun the bridge
and the surrounding area. KMT troops, with fresh reinforcements,
outnumbered the Japanese and retook the bridge the next day.
It was during this battle that broadsword troops were thrown
into the fight, and they succeeded in beheading many of the
Japanese invaders.
Just days later, a song called the "Broadsword March," which
went: "Assault, assault, with our broadswords, striking the heads
off Japanese invaders," had spread across the whole country.
Manifesto
In the years since China's victory in the war, debate has raged
over the incident with some historians, particularly those from
Japan, claiming that it was unintentional.
Li Zhongming, a historian with the Institute of Modern History
under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, believes the incident
was a result of Japan's long-term planning to invade China.
In appearance, the incident was no different from previous
military skirmishes aroused by the Japanese military's provocative
actions. But records show that on the second day of the incident,
Japan decided to move its troops from occupied northeast China to
Peiping and just four days later, Japanese Prime Minister Fumimaro
Konoe (1891-1945) moved to increase Japan's military presence in
north China.
"Without long-time preparation, it would have been impossible
for a country to launch such a massive war over such a short period
of time," Li told China Daily.
Hou Xiguang, a historian from the Beijing Academy of Social
Sciences, quoted the memoirs of Takeo Imai, a Japanese military
intelligence officer, in an article to prove that before the July 7
Incident, rumor had been spreading among officials in Tokyo that an
attack against the Chinese army would take place on July 7.
Li Huaxing, a historian with the Shanghai Academy of Social
Sciences, said that the Lugouqiao Incident was the starting point
of China's comprehensive defense against Japanese troops across the
country.
On July 8, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of
China, which for years had been calling on the country to unite to
fight Japan's aggression, issued a manifesto to the whole nation
calling for a war of resistance. The manifesto reads in part:
"Fellow countrymen! Peiping and Tientsin (Tianjin) are in peril!
Northern China is in peril! The Chinese nation is in peril! A war
of resistance by the whole nation is the only way out
"Let the people of the whole country, the government, and the
armed forces unite and build up the national united front as our
solid Great Wall of resistance to Japanese aggression! Let the
Kuomintang and the Communist Party closely cooperate and resist the
new attacks of the Japanese aggressors!"
What was unfolding also proved that the Lugouqiao Incident was
merely a ploy by the Japanese to launch an all-out invasion of
China.
On July 8, negotiations were held between general Hashimoto, the
commander of all Japanese forces around the cities of Peiping and
Tientsin, and General Zhang Zizhong (1891-1940), a subordinate of
General Song Zheyuan (1885-1940), commander-in-chief of the 29th
Army. Song was then still away in Shandong on holiday.
On July 9, the Chinese side accepted the Japanese request to
retreat to the bases they held before the July 7 Incident. However,
during the negotiations, two Japanese divisions were on the march
to north China from northeast China, or so-called Manchuria, and
Korea, then a colony of Japan.
On July 11, Japanese Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe issued an
order to increase Japan's military presence in north China. By July
24, Japanese troops in nearby Peiping had surpassed 100,000,
equipped with artillery, tanks, and bombers.
On the other side, the 29th Army, although more than 100,000
strong, was equipped with only rifles and barely enough mortars and
heavy machine guns. Between July 11 and 23, Song failed to prepare
for the coming conflict, believing it would be another small-scale
affair like those of previous years, which were all solved
diplomatically.
But the time for diplomacy had passed.
On July 17, Chiang Kai-shek published his A Serious
Declaration on the Lugouqiao Incident, stating that Chinese
people loved peace, but would not pursue peace when their territory
was invaded.
Japan's demands following the Lugouqiao Incident were more than
China could accept; the Rubicon had been crossed.
On July 25, in Langfang, then a small town about 100 kilometers
east of Peiping, Japanese troops attacked Chinese soldiers
defending the railway station. The conflict soon spread to
Peiping.
During the night of July 27, Japanese troops began comprehensive
attacks against the Chinese military in Peiping. Supported by
bombers and tanks, Japanese troops occupied Nanyuan, a military
fort in southern suburban Peiping.
Fierce battles raged.
General Tong Linge (1892-1937), vice commander of the 29th Army
and General Zhao Dengyu (1898-1937), a divisional commander of the
29th Army, both lost their lives in the fight for the city.
Meanwhile, some 5,000 Chinese officers and soldiers were either
killed or wounded.
Despite a brave defense, Song decided to withdraw his main force
from Peiping on July 28.
Throughout the night of July 29, Chinese troops began the fight
back against Japanese troops in Tianjin. The battle lasted nearly
20 hours before Chinese troops were forced to withdraw in the face
of superior firepower and numbers.
On August 1, the remaining Chinese soldiers in Peiping pulled
back, leaving the ancient Chinese capital to the Japanese.
On August 13, a bloody battle broke out between Chinese and
Japanese forces in Shanghai. Chinese soldiers were ordered to
attack, with light weapons, Japanese positions equipped with modern
weapons of war. More than 500,000 Chinese soldiers were killed or
wounded in the intense fighting.
The stance of the KMT government, with support from the
Communist Party and other organizations, then became clear China
would not give in to Japanese military strength. The KMT government
began to assemble its troops across the country and moved vital
industrial equipment to mountainous Southwest China then in China's
rear.
Meanwhile, the Japanese government passed several acts between
July and September 1937 increasing the budget for its invasion of
China, stopped demobilizing soldiers, and began calling up more men
to the army.
By mid-1938, 95 percent of Japanese ground forces had been sent
to the China front.
Yet, after the Lugouqiao Incident, the ferocious and modern
Japanese army bogged down in the vastness of China and they came up
against strong resistance from the Chinese people.
Eventually, the Japanese were forced to suffer what they had
sown, bitterly, said General Li Zongren (1891-1969), former vice
president of the KMT government, in a chapter of his memoirs on the
Japanese invasion.
(China Daily July 7, 2005)