China on Thursday issued a white paper entitled China's
Endeavors for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation
to fully elaborate on the Chinese government's policies and
positions on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation.
The white paper, issued at a press conference in Beijing by the
State Council Information Office, comprises seven parts: Foreword,
International Security and Arms Control Situation, China's Basic
Policy and Position, Participating in and Promoting International
Arms Control and Disarmament Process, Committed to National and
Regional Disarmament, Actively Participating in International
Non-Proliferation Efforts, Tightening Non-Proliferation Export
Control.
Subjected to untold external aggression and suppression in its
modern history, China fully understands how precious peace is, says
the white paper in its Foreword.
China will remain committed to pushing forward the process of
international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, it
adds.
The following is the full text of the document:
China's Endeavors for Arms Control, Disarmament
and Non-Proliferation
Foreword
I. International Security and Arms Control
Situation
II. China's Basic Policy and Position
III. Participating in and Promoting International
Arms Control and Disarmament Process
IV. Committed to National and Regional
Disarmament
V. Actively Participating in International
Non-Proliferation Efforts
VI. Tightening Non-Proliferation Export
Control
Annexes
Annex I: List of Arms Control, Disarmament and
Non-Proliferation Treaties That China Has Joined
Annex II: Laws and Regulations of China on
Non-Proliferation Export Control
Annex III: Agreements on Disarmament and
Confidence-Building Measures Between China and Relevant
Countries
The year 2005 marks the 60th anniversary of the victories of the
Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and
the World Anti-Fascist War. The war of aggression launched by
fascists and militarists brought about untold sufferings to the
world and wreaked unprecedented havoc on human civilization. The
world people won victories and peace with their blood and
lives.
The year 2005 also marks the 60th anniversary of the founding of
the United Nations (UN), the most universal, representative and
authoritative inter-governmental international organization in the
world. The establishment of the UN has embodied the aspiration of
peoples around the world for building a new world of peace,
equality, cooperation and prosperity. The UN, over the past 60
years, has worked unremittingly for and played an important role in
easing conflicts, promoting disarmament, safeguarding peace and
boosting development.
The Chinese nation loves peace and advocates that nothing is
more valuable than peace and all nations should live in peace and
harmony. Subjected to untold external aggression and suppression in
its modern history, China fully understands how precious peace is.
At present, the Chinese people are concentrating on development and
nation-building along a road of peaceful development. China needs a
long-lasting and stable international environment of peace for her
development, which, in turn, will promote world peace and progress.
China, holding high the banner of peace, development and
cooperation, will remain committed to pushing forward the process
of international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation.
China will never seek hegemony and will remain forever a staunch
force for safeguarding world peace and promoting common
development.
This White Paper, China's Endeavors for Arms Control,
Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, is published to fully elaborate
on the Chinese government's policies and positions on arms control,
disarmament and non-proliferation and to give a systematic account
of China's involvement in the international arms control,
disarmament and non-proliferation affairs.
I. International Security and Arms Control
Situation
Peace, development and cooperation have become the trend of the
times in the current world. World multi-polarization and economic
globalization are developing in depth, and science and technology
are advancing by leaps and bounds. Countries and regions have
constantly strengthened their exchanges and cooperation as they are
increasingly interdependent in security. World peace and
development are facing rare opportunities as factors for
maintaining peace and restraining war are increasing. It has become
the consensus of the international community to enhance cooperation
and jointly meet global challenges.
However, the world is far from tranquil as traditional security
issues persist, local wars and violent conflicts crop up time and
again and hot-spot issues keep emerging. Non-traditional security
threats such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD), transnational crimes and infectious diseases are
on the rise. The intertwined traditional and non-traditional
threats pose severe challenges to international security.
International arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation
are closely linked with international security. Given more
diversified threats to international security and larger numbers of
unstable and unpredictable factors, the dimensions of arms control,
disarmament and non-proliferation have been constantly expanded
with increasing importance. Opportunities and challenges develop
side by side while hopes and potential risks coexist.
On the one hand, as an integral part of the global security
order, the international arms control, disarmament and
non-proliferation regime is still playing an important role in
safeguarding world peace and stability. Since the 1990s, fresh
achievements have been scored in arms control, disarmament and
non-proliferation. A number of important treaties have been
concluded in such areas as the prohibition of chemical weapons and
nuclear tests. The international consensus has been constantly
strengthened on preventing the proliferation of WMD. The UN
Security Council has unanimously adopted Resolution 1540 on
non-proliferation. Political and diplomatic efforts have been
continuously pursued to settle proliferation issues through
dialogue and cooperation. Initiatives on strengthening the
non-proliferation regime have been introduced. Security dialogues
have been intensified among countries and regional security
cooperation has been expanded. The aforementioned progress has
enhanced mutual trust among countries, boosted the relaxation of
the security situation and maintained international strategic
stability.
On the other hand, there is still a long way to go in
multilateral arms control and disarmament. The process of nuclear
disarmament has been long and arduous. The nuclear deterrence
strategy based on the first use of nuclear weapons has yet to be
abandoned. The trend toward lowering the threshold for the use of
nuclear weapons and developing new nuclear weapons is worrisome.
There has been greater danger of weaponization of and an arms race
in outer space. The universality of international treaties on arms
control is still inadequate and negative examples of scrapping
important arms control treaties occur from time to time. The
multilateral arms control and disarmament regime is faced with
difficulty. As the single multilateral disarmament negotiating
body, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva has for years
been unable to carry out substantive work. The international
non-proliferation process is facing challenges. The prospect for
settling regional nuclear issues is still blurry and the risks of
terrorist organizations and other non-state entities acquiring WMD
are growing.
Currently, the international process of arms control,
disarmament and non-proliferation is at a crucial crossroad. It is
an absolute necessity for the maintenance of international peace,
security and stability to seize fresh opportunities, meet new
challenges and consolidate and constantly strengthen the existing
international regime on arms control, disarmament and
non-proliferation. This also conforms to the people's will. The
international community is in favor of maintaining multilateralism,
pushing forward the international process of arms control and
disarmament, constantly improving the international
non-proliferation regime, stepping up international cooperation and
coping with security challenges.
To promote a fair, rational, comprehensive and sound development
of the international cause of arms control, disarmament and
non-proliferation, the international community should follow the
purposes and principles of the UN Charter and other universally
recognized norms governing international relations, foster a new
security concept featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality
and coordination, enhance mutual trust through dialogue and promote
common security through cooperation. The right of all countries to
equal participation in international arms control, disarmament and
non-proliferation affairs should be guaranteed and the
international process of arms control, disarmament and
non-proliferation promoted on the basis of no derogation of the
security of all countries.
The issue of non-proliferation should be dealt with by political
and diplomatic means within the framework of international law. The
existing international legal system on arms control, disarmament
and non-proliferation should be maintained, further strengthened
and improved. The legitimate rights and interests of all countries
as regards the peaceful use of science and technology should be
guaranteed and the role of the UN and other multilateral
organizations be brought into full play.
II. China's Basic Policy and
Position
China pursues an independent foreign policy of peace, follows
the road of peaceful development, works hard to integrate the
efforts to safeguard its own national interests and promote common
interests of all countries, and strives for a constructive role in
international affairs.
In the field of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation,
China follows the new security concept featuring mutual trust,
mutual benefit, equality and coordination, and commits itself to
creating a favorable international and regional security
environment, maintaining world peace and promoting common
development.
In handling affairs related to international arms control,
disarmament and non-proliferation, the Chinese government always
bases its policy-making on the judgment whether it serves to
safeguard national sovereignty and security, whether it serves to
maintain global strategic stability and whether it serves to
promote security for all and mutual trust among countries.
Complete Prohibition
and Thorough Destruction of WMD
It is the shared aspiration of the international community as
well as the goal of China to thoroughly destroy nuclear weapons and
free the world from such weapons.
The end of the Cold War and the new security situation have made
possible the substantial reduction of nuclear weapons, and then
complete prohibition and thorough destruction of such weapons.
Pushing forward nuclear disarmament process is of great
significance to reducing the danger of nuclear proliferation,
improving international security environment and promoting world
peace and development.
China maintains that nuclear-weapon states should take the
following measures to further promote nuclear disarmament
process.
l????????
An international legal instrument on the complete prohibition and
thorough destruction of nuclear weapons should be concluded at an
early date.
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Nuclear disarmament should be a just and reasonable process of
gradual reduction toward a downward balance. The two countries
possessing the largest nuclear arsenals bear special and primary
responsibilities for nuclear disarmament. They should earnestly
comply with the treaties already concluded on reduction of nuclear
weapons and further reduce their nuclear arsenals in a verifiable
and irreversible manner so as to create conditions for achieving
the ultimate goal of complete and thorough nuclear disarmament.
l????????
Before the goal of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of
nuclear weapons is achieved, nuclear-weapon states should commit
themselves to no first use of nuclear weapons and undertake
unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons
against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones.
l????????
Nuclear-weapon states should abandon the policies of nuclear
deterrence based on the first use of nuclear weapons and reduce the
role of nuclear weapons in their national security.
l????????
Nuclear disarmament measures, including intermediate measures,
should follow the guidelines of maintaining global strategic
balance and stability and undiminished security for all.
l????????
The CD should reach an agreement on program of work soon so as to
begin at an early date negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-off
Treaty (FMCT) and to establish Ad Hoc Committees and start
substantive work on such issues as nuclear disarmament and security
assurances to non-nuclear-weapon states.
China stands for complete prohibition and thorough destruction
of biological and chemical weapons and firmly opposes proliferation
of such weapons.
Against the backdrop of increased threat of bio-terrorism and
prominence of bio-security issue, it is of great realistic
significance to continue to explore and formulate measures to
strengthen the effectiveness of the Biological Weapons Convention
(BWC) under the framework of this Convention. China holds that the
international community should take the following actions.
l????????
Encourage more countries to accede to the BWC and urge all its
States Parties to fulfill their obligations in a comprehensive and
faithful manner.
l????????
Maintain and facilitate the multilateral process aimed at enhancing
the effectiveness of the BWC and explore and formulate concrete
measures through full consultations.
l????????
Encourage more countries to submit to the UN declarations on
confidence-building measures regarding the BWC.
The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is the first international
legal instrument for complete prohibition and thorough destruction
of a whole category of WMD with strict verification mechanism. It
has set a successful example for multilateral arms control and
non-proliferation efforts. To ensure full implementation of the
CWC, China maintains:
l????????
Chemical weapon possessors should double their efforts to complete
the destruction of their chemical weapons at an early date in
strict accordance with the CWC and subject themselves to effective
supervision by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons (OPCW).
l????????
It is imperative to further improve and optimize verification
measures, allocate inspection resources in a fair and equitable
manner and improve its cost-effectiveness.
l????????
Continuously promote the universality of the CWC.
l????????
The country concerned should fulfill its obligations under the
Convention and honor its commitments, start at an early date the
substantive destruction process for the chemical weapons it
abandoned in China so as to destroy those weapons completely and
thoroughly as soon as possible.
Preventing the
Proliferation of WMD and Their Means of
Delivery
Proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery is conducive
neither to world peace and stability nor to China's security. China
firmly opposes proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery.
China believes that proliferation of WMD has complicated root
causes. In order to prevent their proliferation, an integrated
approach must be adopted to address both the symptoms and the root
causes.
l????????
All states should devote themselves to building a global security
environment of cooperation and mutual trust, seeking universal
improvement of international relations and achieving security for
all. This is the best way to eliminate the danger of proliferation
as well as the prerequisite for a smooth non-proliferation
process.
l????????
All states should resort to political and diplomatic means to solve
the proliferation problem. Non-proliferation means should help
maintain and promote international security. Proper solutions to
proliferation issues should be sought out through dialogue instead
of confrontation, and through cooperation instead of
pressuring.
l????????
Full scope should be given to the central role of the UN and other
international organizations. The existing non-proliferation
mechanism should be strengthened and improved under the framework
of international law and on the basis of equal and universal
participation of all countries and democratic decision-making.
l????????
A balance should be struck between non-proliferation and peaceful
uses. The legitimate rights of each state to peaceful uses should
be guaranteed while proliferation activities under the pretext of
peaceful uses be prevented.
Missile
Defense
China views and handles missile defense issues from the
perspective of maintaining global strategic balance and stability
and safeguarding regional peace and security. China understands the
security concerns of relevant countries about the proliferation of
ballistic missiles and their technology and stands for political
and diplomatic solution to this matter. Research, development and
deployment of missile defense systems are by no means an effective
way to solve the problem. China does not wish to see a missile
defense system produce negative impact on global strategic
stability, bring new unstable factors to international and regional
peace and security, erode trust among big powers, or undermine
legitimate security interests of other countries. China is even
more reluctant to see some countries cooperate in the missile
defense field to further proliferate ballistic missile technology.
China believes that relevant countries should increase transparency
in their missile defense program for the purpose of deepening trust
and dispelling misgivings.
As the Taiwan question involves its core interests, China
opposes the attempt by any country to provide help or protection to
the Taiwan region of China in the field of missile defense by any
means.
Preventing
Weaponization of and an Arms Race in Outer
Space
Outer space is the common wealth of mankind. At present, the
danger of weaponization of outer space is increasing with each
passing day. Taking weapons into outer space will lead to an arms
race there and make it a new arena for military confrontation. Such
a prospect is not in the interest of any country.
China has all along stood for peaceful use of outer space. The
existing international legal instruments on outer space cannot
effectively prevent weaponization of and an arms race in outer
space. The international community should take effective preventive
measures, negotiate and conclude relevant international legal
instrument to prohibit deployment of weapons in outer space and the
threat or use of force against objects in outer space so as to
ensure that outer space is used purely for peaceful purposes.
Addressing
Humanitarian Concerns in the Arms Control
Field
China is committed to properly addressing humanitarian issues in
the arms control field. It holds that while humanitarian concerns
are addressed, full consideration should be given to the legitimate
military security needs of sovereign states as well as economic and
technological capacities of all countries. As the Convention on
Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) accommodates both humanitarian
concerns and legitimate military needs, all States Parties should
implement the CCW in good faith and constantly enrich and improve
it if situation requires.
Firmly combating illegal activities in the field of small arms
and light weapons (SALW) is of great importance to maintaining
regional peace, stability and development, fighting terrorism and
cracking down upon such transnational organized crimes as
drug-trafficking and smuggling. China stands for greater efforts at
the national, regional and international levels to seek a
comprehensive solution in this regard.
China has always attached importance to and been supportive of
international efforts in the arms control and disarmament field. To
oppose arms races and strive for disarmament has been an important
part of China's foreign policy ever since the founding of the
People's Republic. China has successively joined and faithfully
implemented relevant international arms control and disarmament
treaties. It has actively participated in important activities in
the field of arms control and disarmament, including relevant
discussions and negotiations in the UN and relevant international
agencies, putting forward many reasonable and feasible proposals in
this regard in a serious effort to promote the international arms
control and disarmament process.
Nuclear
Disarmament
As a nuclear-weapon state, China has never evaded its due
responsibilities and obligations in nuclear disarmament.
China has always stood for the complete prohibition and thorough
destruction of nuclear weapons. Right after its first nuclear test
in 1964, the Chinese government issued a statement, solemnly
proposing to the governments of all countries the convocation of a
world summit to discuss the issue of complete prohibition and
thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.
China has persistently exercised the utmost restraint on the
scale and development of its nuclear weapons. China has conducted
the smallest number of nuclear tests among the five nuclear-weapon
states. China has never taken part and will never take part in any
nuclear arms race. China has never deployed nuclear weapons outside
its own territories. In the 1990s, China closed down a nuclear
weapon research and development base in Qinghai Province.
China's development of nuclear weapons has always been for the
purpose of self-defense. Since the first day when it came into
possession of nuclear weapons, the Chinese government has solemnly
declared that it would not be the first to use such weapons at any
time and in any circumstance. Whether confronted with the nuclear
threat and nuclear blackmail during the Cold War, or faced with the
great changes that have taken place in the international security
environment after the Cold War, China has always stayed true to its
commitment. China's policy in this regard will remain unchanged in
the future.
China has been actively promoting the conclusion of a
multilateral treaty among nuclear-weapon states on mutual
no-first-use of nuclear weapons against each other. In January
1994, China formally presented a draft text of the Treaty on the
No-First-Use of Nuclear Weapons to the other four nuclear-weapon
states. At the same time, China worked vigorously for arrangements
among nuclear-weapon states on mutual no-first-use of nuclear
weapons and mutual detargeting of nuclear weapons at each other. In
September 1994, China and Russia declared that they would not be
the first to use nuclear weapons against each other and would not
target their strategic nuclear weapons at each other. In June 1998,
China and the US declared the detargeting of their nuclear weapons
against each other. In May 2000, China, together with the other
four nuclear-weapon states, issued a joint statement declaring that
their nuclear weapons are not targeted at any country.
Ever since the first day when it came into possession of nuclear
weapons, China has committed unconditionally not to use or threaten
to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or
nuclear-weapon-free zones. In April 1995, the Chinese government
made a statement, reiterating its unconditional provision of
negative security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon states, and
at the same time undertaking to provide these countries with
positive security assurances. In 2000, China and other
nuclear-weapon states issued a joint statement, reaffirming their
security assurance commitment made in Resolution 984 of the UN
Security Council in 1995. China calls upon the other nuclear-weapon
states to unconditionally provide positive and negative security
assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon states, and to conclude,
through negotiations, an international legal instrument to this end
at an early date.
China respects and supports the efforts by relevant countries
and regions to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones or WMD-free
zones on the basis of consultations among themselves and voluntary
agreements in light of actual regional conditions. China believes
that nuclear-weapon states should respect the status of
nuclear-weapon-free zones and assume corresponding obligations.
Proceeding from this position, China has signed and ratified
Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in
Latin America and the Caribbean, Protocols II and III of the South
Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty and Protocols I and II of the
African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. China supports the efforts
by the ASEAN countries and the five Central Asian countries to
establish nuclear-weapon-free zones and is ready to sign relevant
protocols as early as possible after the countries concerned have
reached agreement on the texts. China supports endeavors to
establish nuclear-weapon-free and WMD-free zones in the Middle East
and hopes to see its early realization. China respects and welcomes
Mongolia's status as a nuclear-weapon-free country. China supports
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
China has acceded to the Antarctic Treaty, the Treaty on
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies and the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of
Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed
and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, and has undertaken
corresponding obligations.
China firmly supports the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT). China has made significant contributions to the conclusion
of the Treaty and was among the first to sign it. In July 1996, the
Chinese government declared a moratorium on nuclear test, and has
all long honored such commitment. China supports the early entry
into force of the CTBT and hopes that all countries will sign and
ratify it at an early date. Meanwhile, China appeals to
nuclear-weapon states and other relevant countries to maintain the
moratorium on nuclear test before the CTBT comes into force.
Currently, China is working vigorously on its domestic legal
procedures for the ratification of the CTBT, and has established
competent national agency to prepare for its implementation. China
has actively participated in the work of the CTBT Preparatory
Commission and all previous Conferences on Facilitating the Entry
into Force of the CTBT.
China supports the early start of the negotiation of a treaty on
the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear
weapons or other explosive devices on the basis of a comprehensive
and balanced program of work to be reached by the CD in Geneva.
Biological and
Chemical Weapons
China suffered a lot from the use of biological and chemical
weapons by foreign countries in history. The chemical weapons
abandoned by Japan on Chinese soil are still posing a grave and
real threat to the lives and property of the Chinese people, and to
the ecological environment.
China supports the efforts by the international community to ban
biological and chemical weapons and has actively participated in
the negotiations of relevant treaties or protocols. China has taken
concrete actions to promote the process undertaken by the
international community to achieve complete prohibition and
thorough destruction of biological and chemical weapons.
China acceded to the BWC in 1984, and has always supported and
actively participated in the multilateral endeavors aimed at
strengthening the effectiveness of the Convention. China has
actively participated in the BWC Review Conferences and submitted
reports on compliance with the BWC. Since 1988, China has submitted
to the UN its annual declarations on the confidence-building
measures pursuant to relevant decisions of the Review Conferences.
China has also played an active role in the negotiations on a
protocol to the BWC as well as in the annual meetings of the States
Parties and meetings of the experts.
China actively participated in the negotiations of the CWC and
had called strongly for addressing the issues of prohibiting the
use of chemical weapons and the proper disposal of abandoned
chemical weapons within the framework of the Convention, making it
an international legal instrument truly for the complete ban of
chemical weapons.
As an original State Party to the CWC, China has made positive
contributions to the effective implementation of the Convention and
promotion of its universality. China has established and been
constantly improving its national legislation and other measures
for implementation of the Convention, as well as enhancing the
capabilities of its National Authority. In accordance with the
provisions of the Convention and the national conditions, China has
set up implementation offices at both national and provincial
levels, which constitute an effective nation-wide implementation
system. In regions with advanced chemical industries, city and
county level offices have also been established. China has,
pursuant to the provisions of the Convention, submitted various
categories of initial and annual declarations to the OPCW in a
timely and comprehensive manner. By the end of June 2005, China has
received 95 on-site inspections by the OPCW, the conclusions of
which have all demonstrated that China has strictly implemented its
obligations under the Convention.
The Chinese government has been constantly promoting the
implementation of the CWC in the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region and the Macao Special Administrative Region. In 2004, the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region started to implement the
CWC, as the relevant implementation legislation was adopted and
declarations were submitted to the OPCW through China's Central
Government. Preparatory work for implementation of the CWC in the
Macao Special Administrative Region, including implementation
legislation, has registered steady progress. The Chinese government
attaches importance to the implementation of the CWC in the Taiwan
region of China and will continue to seek proper solution to the
issue in accordance with the One China principle.
In 1999, the governments of China and Japan signed the
Memorandum of Understanding on the Destruction of the Chemical
Weapons Abandoned by Japan in China. Currently, relevant work of
disposing the chemical weapons abandoned by Japan has moved from
the phase of theoretical research and experiment to that of
construction and implementation. The two sides have reached
agreement on issues like the destruction technologies and location
of destruction facility. Specific environmental standards have, by
and large, been worked out. The preparatory work for the excavation
and recovery of the chemical weapons abandoned by Japan and
construction of the destruction facility is currently under way as
planned.
China takes an active part in the activities of the OPCW and has
organized in China, jointly with the OPCW, three regional seminars
on the implementation of the CWC and two training courses for
inspectors. China also devotes itself to the promotion of economic
and technological development in the chemical field, as well as
trade and other international cooperation among States Parties for
peaceful purposes.
Prevention
of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS)
China has been vigorously calling for attention and efforts by
the international community to prevent an arms race in and the
weaponization of outer space. China stands for the establishment of
an Ad Hoc Committee on PAROS by the CD in Geneva to negotiate an
international legal instrument on PAROS. As a first step, the CD
should set out to conduct substantive work on the issue of PAROS at
an early date.
In 2000, China submitted to the CD a working paper entitled
"China's Position on and Suggestions for Ways to Address the Issue
of Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space at the Conference on
Disarmament," pointing out that PAROS should be one of the top
priorities on the CD's agenda, and proposing the reestablishment of
the Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate an international legal instrument
in this regard.
In June 2002, China, Russia, Belarus, Indonesia, Syria, Vietnam
and Zimbabwe submitted to the CD a joint working paper entitled
"Possible Elements for a Future International Agreement on the
Prevention of Deployment of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or
Use of Force against Outer Space Objects," putting forward specific
proposals on the major elements for the future international legal
instrument, which has gained wide support from many countries.
In August 2004, China and Russia jointly distributed two
thematic papers at the CD, entitled "Existing International Legal
Instruments and the Prevention of the Weaponization of Outer Space"
and "Verification Aspects of Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer
Space."
In March 2005, China and Russia, together with the UN Institute
for Disarmament Research and the Simons Foundation of Canada,
successfully hosted an international conference in Geneva on
"Safeguarding Outer Space Security: Prevention of an Arms Race in
Outer Space".
In June 2005, China and Russia jointly distributed a thematic
paper at the CD, entitled "Definition Issues Regarding Legal
Instruments on the Prevention of Weaponization of Outer Space."
Missiles
China supports the important role played by the UN and other
multilateral institutions in addressing missile and related issues.
China advocates the establishment of a fair and non-discriminatory
multilateral mechanism universally accepted by the international
community in the field of missile non-proliferation. The UN Group
of Governmental Experts on Missiles is the first specialized
mechanism for addressing missile issues within the framework of the
UN. China has participated in its work constructively.
China shares the non-proliferation objective of the Hague Code
of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC) and took
an active part in the discussions on the draft of the HCOC.
Although China has not joined the HCOC, it has kept in touch with
all parties including the subscribing states to the HCOC, making
joint efforts to prevent the proliferation of ballistic
missiles.
Conventional
Weapons
China earnestly fulfills its obligation under the CCW and has
been dedicated to enhancing its effectiveness and universality.
China has always been deeply concerned about civilian casualties
caused by inappropriate use of landmines, in particular
anti-personnel landmines (APL). China supports appropriate and
reasonable restrictions on the use of landmines, so as to prevent
their indiscriminate use against civilians.
Since its accession to the Amended Protocol on Landmines, China
has strictly implemented the provisions of the Protocol. Public
awareness and education campaigns concerning the implementation of
the Protocol have been launched. A series of new military standards
as required by the Protocol have been adopted. A comprehensive
survey of old or obsolete landmines has been conducted, and a
phased program of modification or destruction of such landmines is
implemented. To date, hundreds of thousands of old or obsolete
landmines have been destroyed. China has observed in good faith its
commitment declared in 1996 to a moratorium on export of APL that
do not meet the requirements of the Protocol. In the 1990s, China
conducted two large-scale de-mining operations in the border areas,
thus basically eliminating landmine problems within its
borders.
China fully understands and sympathizes with other countries'
sufferings caused by landmines and has been actively engaged in
international de-mining assistance and cooperation. Since 1998,
China has participated in de-mining operations in about 10
countries in Asia and Africa through various forms of assistance,
including financial donations, providing de-mining equipment and
technical training. In 2004, China and the Australian Network of
International Campaign to Ban Landmines co-sponsored a Humanitarian
Mine/UXO Clearance Technology and Cooperation Workshop in
Kunming.
Though China is not a party to the Ottawa Convention, it
endorses the humanitarian purposes and objectives of the Convention
and has been constantly strengthening exchanges and communication
with its States Parties.
China also attaches importance to the issue of anti-vehicle
landmines (AVL). China is of the view that the issue of AVL should
be addressed differently from that of APL, as the extent of the
humanitarian concerns caused by AVL and APL are different. China is
in favor of a multi-faceted approach to addressing the issue,
taking into full account the specific situation and actual
capacities of different countries.
China played a constructive role in the negotiation and
conclusion of the Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War and is in
favor of its early entry into force. Currently, China is actively
preparing for the ratification of this Protocol.
China supports multilateral efforts to combat the illicit trade
in SALW and has actively participated in the relevant work within
the UN framework. China played a constructive role in the
negotiation of the Firearms Protocol and signed the Protocol in
December 2002. China supports and actively participated in the
negotiation of the UN Instrument on Identifying and Tracing Illicit
SALW. It has earnestly implemented the UN Program of Action on SALW
and has submitted its national reports in a timely manner. In April
2005, China hosted an international workshop on SALW in Beijing,
which was co-sponsored with the UN, Japan and Switzerland.
China has unswervingly pursued a national defense policy that is
defensive in nature. Under the premise of ensuring national
security interests, China has always kept the quantity and size of
its armed forces at the minimum level necessary for maintaining
national security and has for many times taken the initiative to
adopt unilateral disarmament.
Attaching high importance to the security, stability and
development of the Asia-Pacific region, China has adhered to the
principle of "building friendship and partnership with neighboring
countries" and the policy of "fostering an amicable, peaceful and
prosperous neighborhood," endeavored to seek effective approaches
for confidence-building measures (CBMs), actively participated in
the construction of regional security mechanism and devoted itself
to establishing an Asia-Pacific security framework featuring
dialogue rather than confrontation.
Large-scale
Reduction of the Military Personnel
China made the decision to downsize its military personnel by
one million in 1985. By 1987, the size of the People's Liberation
Army (PLA) had been reduced from 4.238 million to 3.235 million and
further reductions followed thereafter. By 1990, the number of
armed forces had been cut down to 3.199 million, downsized by a
total of 1.039 million.
Since 1990, China's armed forces have undergone a series of
adjustments and their size has continued to shrink. China decided
in 1997 to once again downsize its military by 500,000 within three
years, reducing its military size to the level of 2.5 million. In
2003, China decided to further cut down the number by 200,000
within two years and to reduce its military size to the level of
2.3 million.
The wide scope and magnitude of China's unilateral disarmament
in such a relatively short period of time are rarely seen in the
history of international arms control and disarmament. This has
fully demonstrated the firm belief of the Chinese government and
people on the arms control and disarmament cause as well as their
sincere aspiration for peace and development.
Maintaining a Low
Level of Defense Spending
China has always put emphasis on the control of its defense
expenditure scale. The defense spending is appropriately allocated
under the guideline of coordinated development of national defense
and economy. Since the adoption of the reform and opening-up
policies, the Chinese government has kept its defense expenditure
under strict control in order to concentrate its strength on
economic development. From 1979 to 2004, the percentages of China's
defense expenditure to its financial expenditure of the same period
followed a downward curve on the whole. It was 17.37% in 1979, and
7.76% in 2004, down by about 10 percentage points.
|
China's overall defense expenditure remains at a relatively low
level in the world. This is not only reflected in the absolute
amount of defense expenditure, but also in the percentages to the
GDP and financial expenditure. In 2004, China's defense expenditure
registered 219.986 billion yuan, accounting for 1.61% of that
year's GDP and 7.76% of that year's financial expenditure and
amounting to only 5.77% of that of the US, 41.03% that of the
United Kingdom, 75.65% that of France and 63.97% that of Japan.
China's defense budget for 2005 is 247.756 billion yuan.
?
Note: Statistics in the chart are sourced from the national
defense reports, financial reports or other government reports
released by the said countries. In 2003 and 2004, the average
dollar-yuan exchange rate was 8.2770 and 8.2768 respectively.
Chart 3: Percentage of Defense Expenditure to GDP and to State
Financial
Expenditure of Some Countries in 2004 (%)
|
Country
|
US
|
Russia
|
UK
|
France
|
Japan
|
China
|
To GDP
|
4.02
|
2.69
|
3.50
|
2.01
|
0.98
|
1.61
|
To State Financial Expenditure
|
20.09
|
15.49
|
8.33
|
11.14
|
5.97
|
7.76
|
Based on the economic development and revenue growth, China has
moderately increased its defense expenditure in recent years.
However, the increase was relatively small. For most years since
the 1990s, the growth rate of China's defense expenditure has been
lower than that of the state financial expenditure. The increased
part of the defense expenditure has primarily been used for the
following purposes: 1. Increase of the salaries and allowances of
the military personnel to ensure the improvement of their living
standards in step with the socio-economic development; 2. Further
improvement of the social insurance system for servicemen,
including the establishment of systems like casualty insurance,
medical insurance for ex-servicemen, housing subsidy, basic life
guarantee for accompanying spouses of servicemen and social
insurance subsidy; 3. Support for the structural and organizational
reform of the military and proper resettlement for the 200,000
servicemen recently discharged from active service; 4. Increased
investment in the development of high-caliber talents in the
military, and refined incentive mechanism for talented people to
ensure the achievement of the PLA's Strategic Project for Talented
People; and 5. Moderate increase of equipment expenses to improve
the PLA's defensive combating capability under the conditions of
modern technology, particularly high technology.
Chart 4:Comparison Between the Growth Rates of China's
Defense Expenditure and State Financial Expenditure from 1995 to
2004 (%)
?
The Chinese government has always adhered to the principle of
strict control, strict management and strict supervision of defense
expenditure and has established a full-fledged management and legal
system. The Chinese government, pursuant to the National Defense
Law of the People's Republic of China, ensures the necessary funds
for national defense, incorporates the entire expenditure in the
state budget and exercises management over it in accordance with
the Budget Law of the People's Republic of China. Examined and
approved by the National People's Congress, China's defense budget
is open and transparent.
Regional Disarmament
and Confidence-Building Measures
China attaches great importance to and actively promotes the
cooperation on regional disarmament and CBMs. It has reached a
series of agreements and consensus with relevant neighboring
countries, thus making contributions to the improvement of regional
security environment and enhancement of common development. These
agreements reflect the new security concept initiated by China and
embody the principles and spirit that are of universal significance
to security dialogue and cooperation in Asia-Pacific, including
mutual and equal security; seeking security through dialogue and
cooperation; equal consultation and mutually beneficial
cooperation; being not against a third state; no threat or harm to
the security and stability of other countries; insisting on
national defense policy of defensive nature; friendly exchanges in
the military field, etc.
In July 1994, China and Russia signed the Agreement on the
Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities. In April 1996, China,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan signed the Agreement
on Confidence-Building in the Military Field Along the Border
Areas. In April 1997, China signed the Agreement on the Mutual
Reduction of Military Forces in the Border Areas with the
aforementioned countries. These agreements opened the cooperation
process of the "Shanghai Five" and laid down a solid foundation for
the establishment and development of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO). For more than four years since its
establishment, SCO has formed a full-fledged institutional system
and legal basis, smoothly launched the cooperation in the security,
economic and other fields and is growing into a significant
mechanism promoting regional security, stability and
development.
In September 1993, China and India signed the Agreement on the
Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility Along the Line of Actual
Control in the China-India Border Areas. In November 1996, the two
countries signed the Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures in
the Military Field Along the Line of Actual Control in the
China-India Border Areas. In April 2005, the two countries signed
the Protocol on Modalities for the Implementation of
Confidence-Building Measures in the Military Field Along the Line
of Actual Control in the China-India Border Areas, which is an
agreement on the concrete implementing approaches of relevant
clauses in the Agreement signed in 1996. The signing and
implementation of these agreements have played important and
positive roles in maintaining peace and tranquility in the
China-India border areas, promoting the friendly relations between
the two countries and facilitating the peaceful resolution of the
border issue.
In November 2002, China and ASEAN signed the Declaration on the
Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), which showed
all parties' common desire to maintain stability and carry out
cooperation in this region. The parties concerned undertook to
resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful
means, refrain from taking any actions that would complicate or
escalate disputes, promote mutual trust through dialogues between
defense officials and voluntary notification of joint military
exercise, and actively carry out cooperation in the fields of
marine environmental protection, marine scientific research, safety
of navigation and communication at sea, search and rescue operation
and combating transnational crimes. In December 2004, China and
ASEAN held the Senior Officials Meeting on the Implementation of
the DOC, at which important consensus was reached on launching the
South China Sea cooperation and the decision was made on the
establishment of a Joint Working Group for the implementation of
the DOC. In August 2005, the first meeting of the Joint Working
Group was convened in the Philippines.
China attaches great importance to the role played by the ASEAN
Regional Forum (ARF), supports its CBMs and voluntarily submits the
Annual Report on Security Outlook every year. Since 1997, China has
hosted two Inter-sessional Meetings on CBMs of the ARF and
undertaken eight CBMs programs, including Training Courses on
Chinese Security Policies, Seminar on Military Logistics Support
and Seminar on Strengthening Cooperation in the Field of
Non-traditional Security Issues. China supports gradual expansion
of defense officials' participation in the ARF. At the ARF's Tenth
Meeting of Foreign Ministers in 2003, China put forward the
proposal of convening a meeting on security policies, and in
November 2004, the first ARF Security Policy Conference was held in
Beijing.
V. Actively Participating in International
Non-Proliferation Efforts
Preventing the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery
is the common task of the international community. China firmly
opposes the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery and
has actively participated in international non-proliferation
process. China has joined all international treaties and relevant
organizations in the field of non-proliferation, and has maintained
active exchanges and cooperation with other countries and relevant
multinational export control mechanisms. China has actively
participated in the diplomatic efforts of the international
community to address relevant non-proliferation issues, working to
promote resolution of such issues by peaceful means through
dialogues and cooperation.
Fulfilling
International Obligations of
Non-Proliferation
Since joining the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT) in 1992, China has faithfully honored all its
obligations and dedicated itself to maintaining and enhancing the
universality, effectiveness and authority of the NPT. China remains
committed to promoting the three goals of the NPT, namely,
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, nuclear disarmament and
peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
China joined the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in
1984. In 1988, China signed the Agreement Between the People's
Republic of China and the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in
China, and voluntarily placed its civilian nuclear facilities under
the IAEA safeguards. China signed with the IAEA the Protocol
Additional to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement in 1998, and in early
2002 formally completed the domestic legal procedures necessary for
the entry into force of the Additional Protocol, thus becoming the
first nuclear-weapon state to complete the relevant procedures.
In November 1991, the Chinese government announced that it
would, on a continuing basis, notify the IAEA of China's export to
or import from non-nuclear-weapon states of any nuclear material of
over one effective kilogram. In July 1993, China formally undertook
that it would voluntarily notify IAEA of all its import and export
of nuclear material as well as its export of nuclear equipment and
related non-nuclear material. In May 1996, China pledged not to
provide assistance, including nuclear export and personnel and
technical exchanges and cooperation, to nuclear facilities of
non-nuclear-weapon states not under the IAEA safeguards. At
present, acceptance of the IAEA full-scope safeguards by importing
countries has been set by China as the precondition for nuclear
export.
China attaches great importance to the key role of the CWC in
preventing proliferation of chemical weapons. China has promulgated
a series of laws and regulations and adopted relevant control
lists, which constitute a whole set of effective control mechanism
covering production, sales, use, export and import of scheduled
chemicals of the CWC. China has kept close contact with other
States Parties to the CWC on export and import of scheduled
chemicals, verifying and clarifying its export and import data in a
timely manner and strictly implementing the provisions of the CWC
on transferring scheduled chemicals to non-states parties.
China strictly fulfills its obligation under the BWC and has
promulgated a series of laws and regulations to exercise strict
control over export of dual-use biological agents and related
equipment and technologies.
Developing Relations
with Multinational Export Control
Mechanisms
China values the important role of the multinational export
control mechanisms in the field of non-proliferation. China has
conducted active dialogues and exchanges with these mechanisms,
learning from and drawing on their useful experience and practices
for its own reference.
In October 1997, China joined the Zangger Committee. In June
2004, China joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group and is now managing
export control in strict accordance with the rules and list of the
Group.
In February and May 2004, China held two rounds of dialogues
with the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in Paris and
Beijing respectively, exchanging views on export control regimes,
control lists and law-enforcement in the missile field as well as
China's membership in the MTCR. In September 2004, China officially
submitted its application for membership of the MTCR.
China also keeps contacts and exchanges with the Australia
Group. The two sides held two rounds of consultations in March 2004
and March 2005 respectively, during which views were exchanged on
the non-proliferation situation in the biological and chemical
field, implementation of the CWC and the BWC, operation of the
Australia Group and China's non-proliferation policy and export
control measures.
In April 2004 and May 2005, China held two rounds of dialogues
with the Wassenaar Arrangement in Vienna, exchanging views on the
principles of export control on conventional weapons and related
dual-use items and technologies, the control list and "the best
practice." The two sides agreed to hold regular dialogues in the
future.
Conducting Exchanges
and Cooperation on Non-Proliferation
China attaches importance to and actively participates in
bilateral exchanges and cooperation on non-proliferation, whereby
it is able to draw on the useful experience and practices of other
countries in this field. China has maintained consultations and
exchanges with Australia, France, Germany, Japan, the Republic of
Korea, Pakistan, Russia, the UK, the US and the EU. In December
2004, China and the EU signed the Joint Declaration on
Non-Proliferation and Arms Control, in which the two sides confirm
that China and the EU are major strategic partners in the fields of
disarmament and non-proliferation, and define the priority areas
for cooperation in this regard. China has also, in strict
compliance with its non-proliferation policies and export control
laws and regulations, worked with relevant countries to crack down
on proliferation activities through information exchange and
law-enforcement cooperation.
China supports the role of relevant regional organizations and
mechanisms in the field of non-proliferation, and has participated
in relevant exchanges and dialogues in a constructive manner,
exploring effective ways to address non-proliferation issues at the
regional level. China has participated in the initiatives of the
ARF to strengthen non-proliferation efforts. China will, in
cooperation with the US and Singapore, hold an ARF seminar on
non-proliferation in 2006. China is ready to keep contact and
coordination with other parties to jointly promote the regional
non-proliferation process.
Promoting the
Important Role of the UN
As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China supports
the important role played by the UN in the field of
non-proliferation in further consolidating international consensus
and deepening international cooperation.
In early 1992, the UN Security Council issued a Presidential
Statement, defining the proliferation of WMD as a threat to
international peace and security. China played a constructive role
in drafting the Statement.
In April 2004, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1540
unanimously. As the first resolution specifically on
non-proliferation adopted by the Security Council, it is conducive
to promoting and enhancing international cooperation on the basis
of existing international laws, and to properly addressing the
problem of acquisition and trafficking of WMD, their means of
delivery and the related materials by non-state actors. China
actively participated in the consultations on the Resolution, put
forward many constructive proposals and made important
contributions to its adoption. In October 2004, China submitted its
national report on implementation of the Resolution in accordance
with the provisions of the Resolution, which introduced in detail
measures taken by the Chinese government to prevent and combat
proliferation activities by non-state actors in the areas of
legislation, law-enforcement and international cooperation.
Effective export control serves as an important means to pursue
the non-proliferation goal. As a country with certain capacity in
industry, science and technology, China has adopted highly
responsible policies and measures in this regard. After years of
endeavor, China has completed a transition in its non-proliferation
export control from an administrative pattern to one based on law
with relevant measures basically in line with common international
practices.
Legal System on
Non-Proliferation Export Contrololrol
Since the mid-1990s, China has gradually set up a comprehensive
legal system for export control of nuclear, biological, chemical,
missile and other sensitive items and technologies as well as all
military products. The Chinese government has promulgated the
Regulations of the PRC on the Control of Nuclear Export and the
Regulations of the PRC on the Control of Nuclear Dual-Use Items and
Related Technologies Export in the nuclear field; the Regulations
of the PRC on the Export Control of Dual-Use Biological Agents and
Related Equipment and Technologies, the Regulations of the PRC on
the Administration of the Controlled Chemicals together with the
Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Regulations, the
Controlled Chemicals List and the Measures on the Export Control of
Certain Chemicals and Related Equipment and Technologies in the
biological and chemical field; the Regulations of the PRC on the
Export Control of Missiles and Missile-Related Items and
Technologies in the missile field; and the Regulations of the PRC
on the Administration of Arms Export in the arms export field.
China's legislation on export control widely embraces such
international practices as licensing system, end-user and end-use
certification, list control and "catch-all" principle. In order to
reduce the risk of proliferation, relevant regulations also
stipulate that nuclear exports and the export of controlled
chemicals and military products can only be handled by a few
trading companies designated by the Government. All regulations
spell out in detail penalty measures for illegal exports.
The scope of control of the aforementioned regulations is
basically identical with international practices. For example, in
the nuclear field, the control list tallies completely with those
of the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group and will
undergo constant adjustments corresponding to changes made to them;
in the biological and chemical field, the lists are basically the
same as those of the Australia Group; the missile list also
conforms by and large with the annex to the MTCR. In real practice,
the competent export control departments of the Chinese government
may also exercise, on an ad interim basis, export control according
to law on items and technologies not on these lists.
In addition, the Foreign Trade Law of the PRC, the Customs Law
of the PRC, the Criminal Law of the PRC, the Administrative
Punishments Law of the PRC, the Regulations of the PRC on the
Import and Export Control of Goods and the Regulations of the PRC
on the Import and Export Control of Technologies also provide a
legal basis for China's non-proliferation export control.
Non-Proliferation
Export Control Organs
China's non-proliferation export control involves many of the
government's functional departments. So far, a mechanism for a
clear division of responsibility and coordination has been
established among these departments.
China's nuclear export comes under the control of the Commission
of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND),
in coordination with other relevant government departments. Arms
export, including the export of missiles, and facilities and key
equipment used directly for the production of missiles, is under
the control of the COSTIND and the relevant department under the
Ministry of National Defense, in coordination with other government
departments concerned.
The export of nuclear dual-use items, dual-use biological
agents, certain chemicals, and the missile-related dual-use items
and technology for civilian use is under the control of the
Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), in coordination with other
government departments concerned. Among them, the export of nuclear
dual-use items and missile-related dual-use items and technologies
is subject to examination by the MOFCOM, in coordination with the
COSTIND. The export of dual-use biological agents and technologies
related to animals and plants is subject to examination by the
MOFCOM, in coordination with the Ministry of Agriculture if needed.
The export of dual-use biological agents and technologies related
to humans is subject to examination by the MOFCOM, in coordination
with the Ministry of Health if needed. The export of equipment and
technologies related to dual-use biological agents and of equipment
and technologies related to certain chemicals is subject to
examination by the MOFCOM, in coordination with the State
Development and Reform Commission if needed. The export of
controlled chemicals is subject to examination by the State
Development and Reform Commission, in coordination with the
MOFCOM.
The export of sensitive items and related equipment and
technologies that relate to foreign policy is subject to
examination by the above-mentioned competent departments, in
coordination with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Where the export
items entail significant impact on national security and public
interests, the competent departments shall, jointly with other
relevant departments, submit the case to the State Council and the
Central Military Commission for approval.
The General Administration of Customs (GAC) is responsible for
supervision and control of the export of the above-mentioned items
and technologies, and it also participates in investigating and
handling cases of illegal exports. The Customs have the authority
to question whether the items from the exporters are sensitive
items and technologies, and to request the exporters to follow
regulations and apply to competent government departments either
for export license or for relevant certificates to show that the
exports are not controlled items.
Rigorous
Implementation of Laws and Regulations on Non-Proliferation Export
Control
The Chinese government attaches great importance to law
enforcement and has adopted a series of effective measures to
ensure the implementation of laws and regulations on export
control.
In November 2002, the MOFCOM formulated the Measures on the
Administration of Export Registration for Sensitive Items and
Technologies. In December 2003, the MOFCOM and the GAC jointly
formulated the Provisional Measures on the Administration of Export
Licenses on Sensitive Items and Technologies. These measures
standardized the export of sensitive items and technologies as well
as the application, approval, issuance, use and verification of
license. In January 2004, the MOFCOM and the GAC jointly launched a
computer control system for the export of sensitive items and
technologies by connecting within the same network different
agencies that approve and issue the license with the supervision
branch of the Customs. This has greatly enhanced the capacity to
supervise and control the export of sensitive items and
technologies.
Based on control lists for nuclear, biological, chemical and
missile exports, the MOFCOM and the GAC jointly compiled the Export
Licensing Catalogue of Sensitive Items and Technologies covering
658 items and technologies, of which 34% have had their customs
code determined. China's Customs also extensively apply hi-tech
equipment in various links in the process of supervision and
control of customs clearance, which has significantly upgraded the
capacity of on-site law enforcement and efficiency of
examination.
Relevant competent authorities on export control have set up a
"national expert supporting system for export control" that engages
experts from nuclear, biological, chemical and missile fields to
assist competent authorities in making correct and scientific
judgments on relevant items during the process of export
examination and approval.
In non-proliferation export control, the Chinese government
adheres to the principle of enforcing the law strictly and
punishing all offenders. For any suspected case of illegal export
of sensitive items and technologies, competent authorities carry
out careful investigation and handle it according to law. Since the
end of 2002, the Chinese government has dealt with scores of cases
of various types concerning illegal export of sensitive items and
technologies. Competent authorities have put the companies involved
in these cases on a "watch list" so as to prevent the recurrence of
similar activities.
In May 2004, the Chinese government established an inter-agency
contingency mechanism for export control and spelt out in detail
the responsibilities, division of labor and work procedures of
relevant export control departments in dealing with emergency cases
in this respect. This has provided an institutional safeguard for
swift and effective handling of such cases.
Greater
Publicity for Laws and Regulations on Export Control and Education
for Enterprises
The Chinese government attaches importance to educating and
training law enforcement officials for export control, especially
those at the grass-roots level, so as to raise their policy
awareness and capability to exercise export control according to
law. After the release of relevant laws and regulations on export
control, the MOFCOM carried out comprehensive training programs on
policies, laws and regulations for commerce officials at local
levels. In places prone to cases of illegal export, the MOFCOM also
holds, on non-regular basis, special training courses on policies,
laws and regulations and law-enforcement of export control. In May
2004, the GAC, jointly with relevant organs in charge of
non-proliferation export control, conducted training programs for
on-site customs officials across the country on policies, laws and
regulations with regard to the export control of sensitive items
and technologies.
The Chinese government has taken various measures to make the
legislation on export control known to enterprises, with a view to
raising their awareness and self-discipline to abide by the law.
Major measures include: to publish the full text of laws and
regulations on export control on the web sites of competent
government departments; to get export enterprises familiarized, by
organizing regular training courses and lectures and distributing
pamphlets, with policies, laws and regulations on export control as
well as the procedures for export examination and approval to
ensure that the enterprises implement them in real earnest and run
their business according to law; to set up a hotline to timely
clear up doubts or questions from the enterprises; and to
investigate and punish illegal exporters and make them public.
The Chinese government encourages and guides the enterprises to
build their own internal mechanisms for non-proliferation export
control and implement accountability for non-proliferation in
accordance with their own specific situations. Some enterprises
have set up offices for non-proliferation export control to
disseminate information of relevant national policies and
legislation, draw up specific measures for implementation within
the enterprises, and supervise their own scientific research,
production and business operations so as to ensure that the
enterprises abide by national laws and regulations. They also have
in place an accountability mechanism in which the legal person is
responsible for non-proliferation work of his/her enterprise while
administrative and other personnel in relevant sections sign
responsibility pledges and fulfill their non-proliferation
obligations accordingly. The Chinese government also encourages
enterprises to exchange experiences in export control.
The non-proliferation export control is a long-term task. The
Chinese government will keep on improving its legislation in this
regard, enhancing the capacity-building of law enforcement, setting
up and optimizing internal mechanisms, and reinforcing publicity of
legislation as well as education and training for enterprises, in a
bid to make due contributions to the international
non-proliferation endeavor.
Annexes
Annex I: List of Arms Control, Disarmament
and Non-Proliferation Treaties That China Has Joined
In the Nuclear
Field
Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (signed in
August 1973, the instrument of ratification deposited in June
1974)
Additional Protocols II and III to the South Pacific
Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty (signed in February 1987, the instrument
of ratification deposited in October 1988)
Agreement Between the People's Republic of China and the
International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of
Safeguards in China (signed in September 1988, effective since
September 1989)
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
(acceded in February 1989)
Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons
and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean
Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (acceded in February 1991)
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (acceded in
March 1992)
Convention on Nuclear Safety (signed in 1994, ratified in April
1996)
Protocols I and II to the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone
Treaty (signed in April 1996, the instrument of ratification
deposited in October 1997)
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (signed in September
1996)
Protocol Additional to the Agreement Between the People's
Republic of China and the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in
China (signed in December 1998, entered into force in March
2002)
In the Chemical
Field
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction
(signed in January 1993, the instrument of ratification deposited
in April 1997)
In the Biological
Field
Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating,
Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of
Warfare
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and
on Their Destruction (acceded in November 1984)
In the Conventional
Field
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively
Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects and Protocols I-III
(signed in September 1981, the instrument of ratification deposited
in April 1982; the amended Article 1 of the Convention ratified in
June 2003, the instrument of ratification deposited in August
2003)
Amended Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of
Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices Annexed to the Convention on
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional
Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have
Indiscriminate Effects (Amended Protocol II) (the instrument of
ratification deposited in November 1998)
Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons Annexed to the Convention on
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional
Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have
Indiscriminate Effects (Protocol IV) (the instrument of
ratification deposited in November 1998)
Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in
Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, Supplementing
the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized
Crimes (signed in December 2002)
In Other
Fields
The Antarctic Treaty (acceded in June 1983)
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies (instrument of accession deposited in December
1983)
Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space
(acceded in December 1988)
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile
Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (acceded in June
2005)
??
In the Nuclear
Field
Regulations of the PRC on the Control of Nuclear Export
(promulgated in September 1997, revised in June 2001)
Regulations of the PRC on the Control of Nuclear Dual-Use Items
and Related Technologies Export (promulgated in June 1998)
Measures on the Administration of Approval for Transfer and
Transit of Nuclear Items (For Trial Implementation) (promulgated in
January 2000)
In the Biological
Field
Regulations of the PRC on the Export Control of Dual-Use
Biological Agents and Related Equipment and Technologies
(promulgated in October 2002)
In the Chemical
Field
Regulations of the PRC on the Administration of Controlled
Chemicals (promulgated in December 1995)
Controlled Chemicals List (promulgated in May 1996, supplemented
in June 1998)
Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Regulations of the
PRC on the Administration of Controlled Chemicals (promulgated in
March 1997)
List of New Chemicals Controlled in Category 3 (promulgated in
June 1998)
Measures on the Export Control of Certain Chemicals and Related
Equipment and Technologies (promulgated in October 2002)
In the Missile
Field
Regulations of the PRC on the Export Control of Missiles and
Missile-Related Items and Technologies (promulgated in August
2002)
In the Arms Export
Field
Regulations of the PRC on the Administration of Arms Export
(promulgated in October 1997, amended in October 2002; the Military
Products Export Control List promulgated in November 2002)
Sensitive
Items
Measures on the Administration of Export Registration for
Sensitive Items and Technologies (promulgated in November 2002)
Provisional Measures on the Administration of Export Licenses on
Sensitive Items and Technologies (promulgated in December 2003)
Export Licensing Catalogue of Sensitive Items and Technologies
(promulgated in December 2003)
Other Related Laws
and Regulations
Foreign Trade Law of the PRC (promulgated in May 1994, amended
in April 2004)
Administrative Punishments Law of the PRC (promulgated in March
1996)
Customs Law of the PRC (promulgated in January 1987, amended in
July 2000)
Amendments to the Criminal Law of the PRC (promulgated in
December 2001)
Regulations of the PRC on the Import and Export Control of
Technologies (promulgated in December 2001)
Regulations of the PRC on the Import and Export Control of Goods
(promulgated in December 2001)
Annex III: Agreements on
Disarmament and Confidence-Building Measures Between China and
Relevant Countries
Agreement Between the Government of the People's Republic of
China and the Government of the Republic of India on the
Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility Along the Line of Actual
Control in the China-India Border Areas (signed in September
1993)
Agreement Between China and Russia on the Prevention of
Dangerous Military Activities (signed in July 1994)
Joint Statement by the President of the People's Republic of
China and the President of the Russian Federation on No-First-Use
of Nuclear Weapons and Detargeting of Strategic Nuclear Weapons
Against Each Other (signed in September 1994)
Agreement on Confidence-Building in the Military Field Along the
Border Areas Among China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and
Tajikistan (signed in April 1996)
Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures in the Military Field
Along the Line of Actual Control in the China-India Border Areas
(signed in November 1996)
Agreement on the Mutual Reduction of Military Forces in the
Border Areas Among China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and
Tajikistan (signed in April 1997)
Agreement Between the Ministry of National Defense of the PRC
and the Department of Defense of the USA on Establishing a
Consultation Mechanism to Strengthen Military Maritime Safety
(signed in January 1998)
Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea
(signed in November 2002)
Protocol Between the Government of the People's Republic of
China and the Government of the Republic of India on Modalities for
the Implementation of Confidence-Building Measures in the Military
Field Along the Line of Actual Control in the China-India Border
Areas (signed in April 2005)
(China.org.cn September 1, 2005)