Cross-Straits relations could have turned for the better if Taiwan leader Chen Shui-bian had honoured even one of his peace proposals to improve the island's ties with the mainland.
Since taking power on May 20, 2000, Chen has time and again come up with peace overtures but never put them into action; rather, he has been pushing hard for Taiwan independence both overtly and covertly, straining ties between the island and the mainland.
But facing a tough battle to be re-elected in the "presidential" polls on March 20, Chen has softened his tone on cross-Straits policy in the run-up to the elections.
On February 3, Chen proposed the so-called "peace and stability framework" across the Straits in a bid to ease mounting pressure over his referendum plan.
Under the framework, he called on Beijing to set up a demilitarized zone, exchange special envoys and establish liaison offices on both sides.
Chen's new proposal came just weeks after he threatened a "holy war" against the mainland.
On February 15, the Taiwan leader went as far to announce his plans to set up a task force to promote peace with the mainland and appoint an envoy to Beijing after the "presidential" elections.
Feeding on illusions
Top mainland academics, however, dismiss Chen's latest peace overtures as nothing but an election gimmick to win votes.
"Chen is just feeding on illusions to cheat those who wish for a peaceful solution to the Taiwan question," says Professor Yan Xuetong, director of the Institute of International Studies at Tsinghua University.
"Apparently, he is using these overtures to deceive the Taiwanese public and the international community to boost his chances of re-election."
The professor tells China Daily that a review of Chen's flip-flopping mainland policy over the past four years well proves he stands politically discredited.
In his inaugural speech in 2000, Chen vowed to follow the "four no's," which requires Taiwan to refrain from declaring independence; changing the "national title,"; including the concept of "state-to-state" relations between the island and the mainland in its "constitution;" and holding any referendum on changing the status quo in regard to independence.
But his actions repeatedly betrayed his words as Chen, of the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), has a strong political ideology.
After rejecting the "1992 consensus" in June 2000, the DPP administration led by Chen began to go all out to pursue independence.
Under the informal 1992 agreement, reached orally between the mainland's Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits and Taiwan's Straits Exchange Foundation in November 1992, the two sides of the Straits both adhere to the one-China principle.
The one-China principle holds that there is only one China in the world; and both Taiwan and the mainland are part of China.
On August 3, 2003, Chen went further to preach "one country on each side (of the Taiwan Straits)," triggering new tensions in cross-Straits ties.
His remarks echoed the notorious "two states" theory put forward by his predecessor Lee Teng-hui in July 1999, in which he defined relations across the Taiwan Straits as "state-to-state".
Politically discredited
Liu Jiayan, a senior researcher with the Institute of Taiwan Studies under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), says Chen is good at couching pro-independence content in non-independence language.
"As a 100 per cent politician in the bad sense, Chen seems to care little about his political credibility and what he cares most is how he can canvass for as many votes as possible for himself," he notes.
"That's why the Taiwanese media describe Chen as a man who changes his policies as frequently and easily as one turns the pages of a book."
The Taiwan leader's erratic political ploy was best unveiled by his plan to initiate the so-called "defensive referendum" alongside the "presidential" elections on March 20.
Realizing he had few achievements to boast of, Chen decided to resort to radical pro-independence moves by pushing ahead referendum legislation last September under the guise of promoting democracy.
The strategy was aimed at both helping Chen pursue de jure independence and wooing more votes from pro-independence voters by antagonizing the mainland.
After the referendum law was passed in November, Chen decided to make the best use of the legal loophole to initiate the "defensive referendum," citing the "constant threat of attack" from the mainland.
He argued that a "defensive referendum" should be pre-emptive by nature; otherwise it would be of no use.
The "defensive referendum" clause enshrined in Taiwan's newly-passed referendum bill gives the island leader the power to ask for a referendum on "national" security matters when the island faces an external threat that could cause a change in "national sovereignty."
But Chen's move, widely believed to be meant to pave the way for a future plebiscite on independence, drew harsh criticism from within the island and the international community, including the United States, France and Germany.
Broad opposition
The two major opposition parties, the Kuomintang Party and People First Party, branded Chen's referendum plan as "illegal" and threatened to boycott it.
In what was seen as a warning to Chen not to provoke the mainland, US President George W. Bush warned in December against any unilateral change to the political status quo between Taiwan and the mainland.
French President Jacques Chirac described Chen's referendum move as a "grave error."
Under mounting pressure on his "defensive referendum" plan, Chen again tried hard to create a false impression that he wanted to improve relations with the mainland.
He finally changed the name of the "defensive referendum" to "peace referendum", which is considered another ploy to cover up his pro-independence conspiracy.
Xu Bodong, director of the Institute of Taiwan Studies at Beijing Union University, says Chen has failed to demonstrate any sincerity to improve bilateral ties and safeguard cross-Straits peace since he came into office.
"Out of his deep-rooted splittist mentality, Chen has been bent on promoting the de-sinofication policy through a series of creeping pro-independence moves," he says.
Besides his independence activities, especially in the cultural and education fields, Chen has been refusing to accept the one-China principle, which is the basis for stabilizing and developing cross-Straits relations, according to Xu.
This explains the stalemate in cross-Straits ties, despite much hope for warmer bilateral ties from the Taiwanese public.
Xu says Chen has played only word games even in the critical issue of opening up the three direct links -- trade, transport and postal services -- across the Straits.
Although Chen said on May 9, 2002 that the establishment of the links is "a road we must take," he took no concrete steps to lift the island's decades-old ban on the three links.
The lack of direct links incurs economic losses amounting to millions of dollars annually to both sides and has contributed a lot to Taiwan's economic woes.
Xu says the reason for the Taiwan authorities' reluctance to set up the three direct links lies in their fear of closer cross-Straits exchanges and strengthened bilateral ties ensuing from the establishment of such links.
The splittist forces on the island are deeply worried that establishing the three direct links will lead to less room for their separatist activities, according to the researcher.
(China Daily February 26, 2004)
