How to interpret the twists of the nuclear dilemma
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After the rocket launch on April 5, 2009, the second underground nuclear test on May 25, 2009, and the subsequent missile launches in North Korea, there has been an undeniable heightening of tension. All parties concerned experience a sense of anxiety and helplessness in the face of a complex situation that has demolished almost all the achievements of years of six-party talks, and may change the current regional security balance completely.
There are some different deep-rooted reasons why the security dilemma cannot currently be resolved. We can interpret them in a number of different ways.
The Korean Peninsula issue involves the contradictions, rivalries and hostilities, especially in security terms, between the North and South Korea, once a single country on the peninsula. There are security suspicions and misperceptions between the North Korea and the US and its traditional allies, particularly South Korea and Japan, who consider North Korea to be a regional and international issue that needs careful handling. The North Korea's development of nuclear weapons actually contravenes the international consensus of nuclear free initiatives on the peninsula, and might destroy the peace and stability of the peninsula and the wider Northeast Asia security system.
There are at least three features of the US policy towards North Korea. First, the Obama administration is cautious and conscious that it must balance the interests and roles of every party concerned – once issued, US policy must be effective, otherwise, the international reputation and image of the US will be damaged. Second, the Obama administration has been preoccupied by other domestic and international issues, such as the financial crisis and turbulence in the Middle East. Third, the Obama administration has few options. Economic and other sanctions are a passive measure and will have little effect, because North Korea has very few economic relations with international society. Brinkmanship is a provocative approach with many possible repercussions. War would be an absolute and disastrous option, which would bring nothing but catastrophe to Northeast Asia. Therefore, "smart diplomacy" towards North Korea offers few options to the Obama administration, other than wait-and-see diplomacy.
The challenges facing China are more complex than those facing any other party involved. China cannot please all the parties who expect the country to take effective action to resolve the complexities of the dilemma. Just as international society cannot call the tune for China, no more can China force North Korea to bow to the will of the international community. Neither can China completely abandon or isolate North Korea as some countries wish. After all North Korea is a neighbor, and critical to China's own national security.
The uncertainty of the US bilateral alliance system has always been a powerful influence on the process of the six-party talks. During the 8th Asian Security Conference in Singapore, ministers of defense from the US, South Korea and Japan stressed that the three parties would continue to exchange views and enhance cooperation to solve the Korea nuclear Issue. That may mean the creation of a trilateral alliance in the form of an Asian NATO against the North Korea. No one can tell whether such an alliance will act as a stabilizing power in the Northeast Asia.
All the parties concerned should therefore demonstrate sincerity and a willingness to launch diplomatic initiatives in a variety of fields to generate more options, whether coercive or persuasive, from which North Korea can choose. At the same time, there should be a more comprehensive multilateral security cooperation mechanism to strengthen mutual security commitments and reduce or eliminate mistrust and misperception inspired by the US's traditional alliance system in Northeast Asia.
