Iran's religious diplomacy: defensive rather than aggressive
- By Jin Liangxiang
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E-mail China.org.cn, January 15, 2013
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More than 30 years has passed since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. At the time, many Iran watchers believed that religion would not play a primary role in future Iranian diplomacy. While in some ways this is true, the fact remains that religion is still a fundamental part of Iran's foreign policy strategy.
The advancement of information and communication technologies in the 21st century have made people more knowledgeable, reasonable and realistic, but have not substantially changed the way that human beings interact with each other, and religion still defines human relationships.
Muslims, who believe that "Muslims all are brothers", as laid out in the Quran, identify with each other collectively as well as individually. That is the Islamic logic of diplomacy that connects various Muslim countries and communities. As a leading country among Shiite nations, Iran is no exception.
When talking about the relationship between religion and state, Shiism can be divided into two camps: activism, which advocates strong engagement of religion with politics, and neutral, which avoids managing Muslims' day-to-day lives.
Many analysts have been enthusiastic about the similarities between Iraqi and Iranian Shiites. But very few realize the differences between the two. Generally speaking, Iraqi Shiites practice neutrality. For instance, Iraqi Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, though a revered Islamic thinker followed by the majority of Iraqi Shiites and millions across the world, including those from Iran, restrains his personal influence in major domestic and regional issues.
Quite differently, Iran's more conservative form of Shiism began under Ayatollah Khomeini and has not changed under present day Ali Khamenei, and a large number of clerics in Qom back the idea of velayat-i-faqih, that is, governments with authority over Shiites should be run by religious clerics in accordance with Islamic law. And the founding of the Islamic Republic actually safeguarded the role of religion in politics at the national level.
Diplomacy is usually regarded as an extension of internal politics. Therefore, policy expanding religious ideology in the 1980s should be the logical outcome of the Islamic Revolution. And religion has been a major factor influencing Iran's foreign policy throughout the 1990s and the beginning of the new century, and is expected to play a role in its foreign policy so long as the Islamic Republic exists. Despite change, consistency is obvious.
During and shortly after the Islamic Revolution, religion was the main objective of diplomacy, partly due to released passion after suffering an extended period of oppression. Though things have changed greatly, today's Iran is more of a nation-state rather than a cause of religious revolutionary. Yet as a leading Islamic state, claimed by itself and partly recognized by the world, Iran still believes it has a religious obligation to work for the interests of Muslims across the world.
The summer of 2012 witnessed fierce clashes between Muslim Rohingyas and Buddhists in Myanmar. Far removed from southeastern Asian countries, Iran was one of the few Muslim countries that had offered substantial support. Iran's major political figures, from the Supreme Leader to the president, the Majilis speaker and the Judiciary minister, all strongly condemned the violence against Myanmar Muslims.
They criticized other Muslim countries' silence and Western indifference to the violence, and urged the UN and other international organizations to take action to protect Muslim Rohingyas. Mahmoud Safari, Iran's consul general at Hyderabad, delivered a check for 6,500 Indian rupees (about US$1,166) to the Confederation of Voluntary Organizations, which works alongside the UN Human Rights Commission, to help refugees.
Iran's concern and diplomacy regarding the 2012 Eurovision Song Contest held in Azerbaijan in May offers another example on how the need to protect the security of religious ideology affected Iran's foreign policy. Some Iranian clerics thought that some of the activities might be a desecration to the Islamic religion. Iran's Ayatollahs even felt offended learning that there would be a gay parade at the end of the pageant, which was actually not planned, according to reports.
Some Iranian clerics voiced strong criticisms against the event. Ayatollah Sobhani issued a statement urging Muslims in the region to protest the contest. Azerbaijan is another country where a majority of its citizens are Shiites, and maintain close ties with Azeris living in Iran.
The disputes caused tensions in bilateral relations between Iran and Azerbaijan, with two opposing demonstrations occurred in Azerbaijan. One opposed the potential kitsch performances; the other protested against Iran's intervention in front of Iran's embassy in Baku. On May 20, Iran recalled its ambassador. Iran officially explained it as a consultation, but Western media interpreted it as a response to the protests.
